The Third South African Republic

Published: January 1, 2025

THE THIRD SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS ARCHITECTURAL NEEDS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Franco Frescura

INTRODUCTION

The creation of hypothetical new social orders and economic systems set in future environments is not novel to modern literature and may be traced as far back as Plato’s “The New Republic”. More recently writers have been using a literary form more popularly described as “science fiction” to explore future alternatives, usually highlighting and exaggerating individual modern trends and allowing them to assume almost obsessive proportions. Whilst these have been valuable as a means of exposing the current follies and foibles of modern society, it also means that few such works of fiction in the past have been based upon a realistic assessment of existing social, political and economic conditions. Most predict the widespread breakdown of society, either through over- population, breakdowns of infrastructure, devaluation of social values, pollution or nuclear holocaust; almost none go through a historically derived pattern of cause and effect to project a series of realistic future scenarios.

One of the few such works which understood and made use of historical processes was Arthur Keppel-Jones, a professional historian, whose book “When Smuts Goes” was published in Cape Town in 1947. In it he postulated the rise, and eventual downfall, of a neo-Nazi South African Reich. He wrote:

“On August 24 the sun rose over an uncannily quiet Pretoria. The sound of gunfire had died away. Here and there flames still flickered and smoke rose from wrecked buildings. A pall of smoke and a queer smell still hung over the city. Hundreds - some thought thousands of vultures circled about in the putrid air. The war was over. Bult was dead. His Republic was dead. The history of his people had come to an end “. (Arthur Keppel-Jones. When Smuts Goes. Cape Town, 1947)

In spite of some obvious miscalculations, his predictions proved surprisingly accurate on a number of issues. The value of such role-playing and future projections should therefore not be underestimated.

To a certain extent the role of this workshop should be considered in a similar light, although its theme, “Black Government”, is probably but one of the options open to this country in future years. For the purpose of this paper I have accepted that a “majority government”, as I prefer to call it, is more than a probability in our future: it is, to my mind, a historical certainty. Certainly an increasing number of influential people and institutions are also beginning to heed this contingency. But a majority government would not be born de facto: it would be subject to a number of historical preconditions which would have an important bearing upon the formulation of its policies in the short, medium and long term.

Therefore if this paper is to avoid the pitfalls of wishful thinking, or join the ranks of fiction, it needs to be based upon premises derived either from current conditions or modelled after parallel events in neighbouring countries.

I might also suggest, at this point, that the identification and analysis of major trends in modern South African society, and their projection into a series of alternative futures for the region might well be the subject for a similar workshop session at some future time.

Inevitably the nature of this paper necessitates that it also make a number of assumptions which are unavoidably based upon personal experiences and philosophies. The use of apartheid-based terms, such as “Homeland”, “Black” and “White”, is being made in the context of current political ideology and must not be interpreted to condone the philosophies they represent.

Particular stress should also be laid upon the importance of making such projections, no matter if, in retrospect, subsequent events relegate them to the realm of fiction. Their relevance lies in the process of formulation, rather than in their final prognostications. Little such thinking and debate is currently taking place in the professions. As a result idealistic and socially aware young graduates are having great difficulty in visualising a role for themselves in either present or a hypothetical “future South African society”. Many who reject the present socio-political order are leaving the country in self-imposed exile. Others are finding it impossible to practice their skills and, as a result, are turning to make their mark in other fields. Either way the country is alienating professional expertise from fields where it can least afford to.

A FEW HISTORICAL PROJECTIONS

It is assumed that South Africa will achieve a majority government at some future, if unspecified, date. Two major methods of transition present themselves:

1. THE HARD OPTION

This is likely to involve massive mobilisation of population; possible external military intervention; large-scale conflict and hence widespread damage to the country’s physical infrastructure. In architectural terms this would mean extensive post-war reconstruction of a scale and nature beyond the scope of this paper, being largely dependant upon resources available and the needs of re-establishing vital services.

2. THE SOFT OPTION

This could include a combination of any number of the following:

Change will be largely the product of a controlled democratic and consultative process, and will occur within the framework of a debating chamber or a negotiating table rather than a battlefield.
It will be preceded by a prolonged campaign of rural guerilla warfare and sporadic strikes against selected urban targets, both military and civilian. This will have the effect of making optimum use of materials expended as against publicity achieved.
Urban infrastructural damage is likely to be relatively small and highly unlikely to approach that suffered in Beirut during the Lebanese civil war.
It is probable that an interim “Muzerewa option” will be attempted as a compromise by the ruling regime.
Little large scale urban action will take place.
Control of urban areas is likely to remain in white hands until the change-over occurs.
Capital interests will force negotiation between the parties before extensive damage can occur to infrastructure.
Capital interests will give subvert financial support to the popular revolutionary movements should they see the tide turning against the existing political system.
Intellectual, religious and moral community leaders will withdraw their support from the regime in increasing numbers as revolutionary movements begin to establish a moral ascendency over their opponents.
Urban infrastructure requiring extensive funding to maintain will begin to break down as finances are channelled increasingly into the military effort.
There will be a marked depopulation by whites of isolated farm areas.
There will be a marked depopulation by whites of “vulnerable” urban areas.
There will be a marked rise in the incidence of absentee landlords in both urban and rural areas. It is also probable that a gradual, ad hoc handing over of some white-owned farm lands to black managerial “caretaker” staff will take place.
White farmers will begin to collaborate or enter into mutual non-aggression pacts with regional guerilla groups.

POLICY DECISIONS INVOLVING ARCHITECTURE AND SETTLEMENT PLANNING

Although this paper chooses to focus on the alternatives arising out of the “soft option” scenario, some of these considerations are equally applicable to events subsequent to widespread conflict.

A future majority government must also focus on the differences between long term but high priority policy, such as housing, as against short term but relatively low priority policy, such as monuments, statues etc.

The provision of high rise housing structures, consisting of two storeys plus, has, generally speaking, been found to have severe limitations in underdeveloped countries. Such an option is highly discouraged by this paper.

A. HOUSING

GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The housing policies of a majority government will have to take into consideration two major factors:

the broad economic needs of the country, and
the material expectations and ideological leanings of its grass roots political support base

Bearing in mind that both factors are subject to separate and conflicting realities, it is probable that such a government will not attempt to meet the needs of either in the short or medium term. Instead a majority government is likely to adopt a differentiated, multi-level approach accommodating a wide range of housing options. These would take into account families of differing size, composition and economic background, from labourers through to professionals, and from single persons through to extended family units. Such a policy is not only elastic, but is also the most economically feasible, given the current nature of the national economy. However it is also designed to meet the needs of an economic middle class already employed and relatively well-off, and would fail to address such fundamental issues as land dispossession and “homelessness” among the poor, particularly in urban areas. A majority government is therefore likely to attempt a “trade-off” between the two, delaying the implementation of more radical social and economic programmes until such a time as it is more firmly in control of other political processes.

The housing stock currently held by the government will be sold to residents for nominal amounts. This however should not be seen as an opportunist move designed to curry populist political favour. It will be appropriate and just, for most of these structures were erected between 1956 and 1966 at a cost of about R500 each, an expenditure which would long have been met by the resident’s rentals had they been allowed to purchase their own homes in the first place. It is also undesirable for a government, any government, to begin acting the role of a landlord. Selling off these houses would therefore remove a source of potential political embarrassment as well as other attendant complications such as maintenance, administration and rent collection.

SHACK HOUSING IN URBAN AREAS

A policy of self-help, appropriate technology housing combined with a system of meaningful collaboration between community and public authority in the provision of basic infrastructure should be instituted. However the wider problem of urban drift should also be addressed by a parallel programme of rural development to encourage food growers to remain on their lands.

SEMI-URBAN CONGLOMERATIONS OF SHACK HOUSING IN RURAL AREAS

The rise of semi-urban conglomerations in rural areas, such as the greater Winterveld, Melalane and Bushbuckridge, to name but a few, poses serious social and environmental problems both in the short, medium and long term. These may be aggravated should the current South African government implement a policy of resettling rural residents in a series of “fortified villages”, such as those employed in Zimbabwe during the course of their guerilla war. These may be resolved in the short term through a policy of self-help housing solutions based upon historical technologies and social processes. In the medium and long term however, these problems may only be met through conventional urban solutions involving standard technologies and infrastructures.

RURAL HOUSING: GENERAL

Housing in most rural areas is not seen as a problem in the short or medium term.

ABSENTEE LANDLORDS

It is foreseen that absentee landlords could become a particularly thorny political question. This paper proposes that a period of grace should be given to permit owners to return to their properties and resume normal lives. Should this fail other measures, such as added tax burdens and, ultimately, governmental expropriation, should be considered. In the case of farmland however, this must be linked to a wider policy of land redistribution and rural food production.

HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY

A programme of realistic low-income housing development will also require extensive revision of existing municipal bye- laws, most particularly those relating to housing standards, building densities, materials, building lines and definitions of quality of workmanship. Infrastructural alternatives relating to the reticulation of water, sewage, electricity and roads will also have to be assessed in terms of local needs and affordability.

LOW INCOME OR POPULAR HOUSING

A majority government will have to carefully evaluate its role and degree of its participation in the provision of housing in the public sector. Ultimately however, the delicate political nature of low-income housing, and the generally exploitative practices of low-income housing practitioners, may well ensure that overall control of this activity may have to remain in government hands. As previously stated a policy capable of providing a wide range of housing alternatives should be considered, having at its lowest level the provision of a basic “core house” or “roof first” structures as its most elemental units. Both are capable of finding application in rural and urban areas.

B. SETTLEMENT

GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

For the purposes of this paper I assume that the restrictions upon black settlement placed by the Group Areas Act, the Gold Laws and similar land-based enactments will be among the first to be repealed by a majority government.

INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDEPENDENT “HOMELANDS”

Despite the racist grounding and oppressive intent of current “homeland” policy, one of its undeniable, and probably unintended, results is the creation of an infrastructure in rural areas, and the fact that black citizens are now receiving training in areas of employment normally closed to them elsewhere in South Africa. I believe that by the time a majority government is in a position to assume power in South Africa, the so-called “Independent Homelands” will be able to make a notable contribution to the administrative running of the country. Control of the Civil Service and an ability to implement its policy decisions will be vital to the political survival of the new government.

RURAL SETTLEMENT

It is of paramount importance that any decisions made in regard with rural settlement also be made in consultation with Agricultural Unions and other food-producing bodies.

Where semi-urban conglomerations have arisen in rural areas as the result of current (and illogical) separatist planning, their inhabitants should be given the option of a State-assisted return to their previous homes. Alternatively, where such settlements appear to have gained a measure of permanence, the State should be instrumental in the establishment of affirmative action programmes designed to promote the development of a social and economic infrastructure, as well as the creation of job opportunities and the eventual increase of community wealth.

The reduction of apartheid-generated rural settlements might also be necessitated by the unwelcome expansion of population densities in such areas. This would have the effect of placing undue stress upon already overloaded or even non-existent physical infrastructures leading to health problems and political destabilisation of the region. An alternative solution might be the expropriation of adjoining farmlands held by absentee landlords and made available for voluntary resettlement at nominal prices. It is difficult however to assess the position of such impoverished areas as the Eastern Province, the Northern Cape and parts of kwaZulu where resettlement programmes beyond the scope of this paper should be envisaged.

I foresee that the redistribution of white-owned agricultural land to black rural inhabitants will present a number of practical problems. On the one hand, there will be a white political backlash to these proposals; on the other the economic realities of black rural society may require that such a program be coupled to parallel communal and cooperative State-subsidised projects requiring a measure of centralised preplanning.

URBAN SETTLEMENT

Urban settlement in this country is controlled by a number of laws and regulations, many of them discriminatory in nature. These include municipal bye-laws, conditions of title deed and the historical, if now-irrelevant, rights of the township owner. Even assuming that a majority government will be in a position to remove such restrictions, the effective control of proclaimed urban and suburban land would still remain firmly in white hands. It is expected that the emergence of a majority government will generate short-term slump conditions in the property market. However these will be followed by a rapid rise in property prices as whites move out of more affordable areas and move into the suburbs. This means that most urban areas will retain their predominantly racial and racist character; that the economic and residential divisions currently existing between haves and have-nots will persist; and that the use of market forces as a strategy to bring about racial integration will meet with little success. This question is likely to be the subject of considerable emotional responses among black and white alike and should be an area of primary focus for a new government.

The problem will be simplified, to a degree, by the occurrence of absentee landlords which should facilitate a policy of expropriation. However it is expected that the amount of housing stock thus released for government-controlled redistribution will be minimal. A majority government will therefore be faced with a number of options. These include:

the subsidy of black families into white suburbs on a random basis. This should have the effect of depressing existing property prices thus paving the way for further black infiltration based upon more realistic property prices.
to subsidise black families into white suburbs on an assessed educational and economic basis. This would largely maintain property prices but create new conditions of social inequality and reinforce existing ones.
to consolidate expropriated properties into larger city blocks of integrated, non-racial residences. Although this option presents some positive aspects, these are offset by the danger that such areas might fail to achieve an equitable racial mix, thus continuing present artificial divisions, if on a smaller and more localized scale.

C. GENERAL POLICY TOWARDS EXISTING BUILDING STOCK

A degree of damage to state-owned public buildings, such as police stations, post offices and military installations, should be expected during the course of a soft option take-over.

RENOVATION AND REVALIDATION

A number of existing buildings servicing the specialized needs and ideological functions of the current regime, such as municipal liquor outlets, “Bantu” Administration Boards and Population Register offices, will have to undergo revalidation to meet the needs of a majority government. This is a relatively high priority consideration.

RESTORATION

The programme of restoring and revalidating government buildings of importance to the national cultural and architectural heritage will continue to take place but will probably require a degree of redefinition of objectives. Little deviation from present policies is expected.

CONSERVATION OF THE NATURAL AND BUILT ENVIRONMENT

This will also involve larger issues such as the declaration of nature parks, sensitive ecological areas, historical environments and national monuments (dealt more fully below).

RECONSTRUCTION

This involves the gradual replacement of such building stock as may be required due to low initial building standards (such as much of Soweto and other government-built black suburbs) or such buildings of a cultural value as may have become damaged accidentally in the course of conflict. Low priority.

D. GENERAL POLICY ON NATIONAL MONUMENTS

Many national monuments have distinct emotional and political connotations attached to their existence. It is inevitable that, initially at least, a certain amount of vandalism and desecration will take place. This should be viewed as a useful and necessary safety valve. In the long run however the soft option also must involve the reconciliation of all parties concerned and the creation, and removal, of national monuments will be an important part of such a process.

EXISTING NATIONAL MONUMENTS

About 93% of all existing national monuments are aimed at perpetuating the myth of white cultural superiority. Many are of a highly emotive nature and some are even racist and hence offensive. These are not expected to last beyond the first onslaught. Where similar symbols, such as the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria, do survive, their control and responsibility for their maintenance should be passed onto interested parties at their own expense. Where there is no response, then a policy of lassaire-faire should be allowed to prevail. This means that such buildings should be allowed to crumble and collapse of their own accord and through lack of popular interest. The symbolism of a ruined monument to the old order should not be lost upon the new society which will replace it.

FUTURE NATIONAL MONUMENTS

It is important that our links to the past be maintained, in spite of any hurtful colonial or political connotations they might have. The maintenance and extension in the scope of present policy is urged.

E. GENERAL POLICIES AFFECTING THE ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSION

The real and potential value of architectural skills to this country should not be underestimated. This is in spite of the profession’s current image as the servant of racial elites and economic vested interests. It is probable that once the nature of the client has changed, the responses of the profession must follow suit.

TERTIARY ARCHITECTURAL EDUCATION

A two-tier educational policy is proposed in our universities based upon an extension of the current course being developed at the University of Cape Town. Ways must be found to open architecture and make it more meaningful to the black community if it is to survive as a learned profession and not as a group of qualified technicians. South African architecture also has a long record of discriminating against local indigenous aesthetics whilst retaining deep-seated links to developments overseas. Programmes of primary, secondary as well as popular education must be instituted.

POSTSCRIPT

This paper should have been delivered to a workshop organized by the Study Group on Internal Relations, at Wits University on Black Government in South Africa: The Promise of the Future, Johannesburg, 20 November 1982. Predictably, its subject did not meet with the approval of the apartheid government, and after its organizers came under pressure from the South African Security Police, it was cancelled it at the last moment. Despite some very real temptations to make cosmetic alterations in order to bring it up to date, I have decided to retain it in its original format as a record of its times.